Educational Paradigms and Models Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Educational Paradigms and Models - Assignment Example Also, students who come from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to engage in complicated paths in school, for example, restarting or repeating their programs due to economic issues. They may also be forced to defer their enrollment in school due to financial difficulties. This may have a negative impact on the number of students in the school and the performance of the school in general. Moreover, students from poor families suffer from poor nutrition because they cannot afford meals that contain a balanced diet. As a result, their memory and attention during instruction may be affected, thus leading to a decreased intelligence quotient score than students from wealthy households (Darling-Hammond, 2010). The Effects of Moral Order Factors on Schools Moral order factors in schools may be attained using several approaches. One strategy is to establish a code of conduct that will highlight rules of action for every condition. Such a code requires a procedure of execution. The mor al order factors under this approach will require schools to have a standard-setting authority. In addition, schools will be compelled to have control systems and agents to the people who are required to abide by these regulations. Also, the individuals who are subjected to the code of conduct will be required to seek more detailed rules or norms for each and every specified case which will be encountered in the school. In addition, the moral order factors will require being continuously moderated to meet the changing situations in the school environment. Moral order factors will also empower and enable people to individually make the right choices and pursue the required way of life, even at the cost of sacrificing their instantaneous desires. Additionally, moral order factors will require a distinctive frame of reference for moral education in schools. Consequently, this will lead to high attachment to school enhanced, school attendance and performance, and elevated commitment to schooling. The Effects of School Board Leadership on Schools School board leadership has a number of effects on schools. School board leadership leads to satisfactory leadership and management of the schools. The board of a school holds the school accountable for its performance. The school board leadership is also active, and this has a positive impact on the development and work of different schools. In addition, a school which is led by a school board has a positive impact on its members of staff. School board leadership makes the principal give sound leadership making all members of staff committed to both the school and to further development. As a result, learning and teaching become satisfactory. Also, school board leadership makes the principal firm, inspirational and focused. This motivates the staff to meet the learners’ educational needs and make significant progress. A highly experienced school board may also offer unlimited advice for the progress of the school a nd support the initiatives executed by the principal (Fullan, 2010).  Ã‚  

Sallust and the Fall of Rome Essay Example for Free

Sallust and the Fall of Rome Essay Sallust also said â€Å"at home they lived frugally and never betrayed a friend†. This means they were always kind and never betrayed anyone. This was all before money became a factor. Sallust could see that Rome was becoming greedy and started to care only about money and knew Rome was going to collapse. He said â€Å"as soon as wealth came to be a mark of distinction and an easy way to renown, military commands and political power, virtue began to decline†. This was before the actual fall of Rome but it was absolutely correct. Rome began to fall apart over money and never went back. They ended up fighting themselves over money and that allowed others to take over. Sallust also said â€Å"such men, it seems to me, have treated their wealth as a mere plaything: instead of making honorable use of it, they have shamefully misused it on the first wasteful project that occurred to them†¦Ã¢â‚¬ . This sums up how the thought of money as a toy and used it on the first thing they saw. This greed made Rome fall. Rome was the greatest empire of its time but all things come to an end. Some things ended with war or disease but Rome fell because of the greed of the people there. Greed never leads to anything good and this is probably the best example of that in history. Sallust was completely right when he predicted the fall of Rome over money but no one listened and that was the end of Rome.

Witches, Supernatural, and Evil in Shakespeares Macbeth :: GCSE English Literature Coursework

The Witches and  Evil in Macbeth    No discussion of evil in Shakespeare’s play Macbeth would be satisfactory without considering its’ most famous symbols of evil: the coven of witches whose interactions with Macbeth play such a vital role in his thinking about his own life. Banquo and Macbeth recognize them as something supernatural, part of the landscape but not fully human inhabitants of it. They have malicious intentions and prophetic powers. And yet they are not active agents in the sense that they do nothing other than talk and offer visions and potions. The witches have no power to compel. If we are to explore the significance of these witches we must do so by treating them as vital poetic symbols in the play, essential manifestations of the moral atmosphere of Macbeth's world.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   The most obvious interpretation of the witches is to see them as manifestations of evil in the world. They exist to tempt and torment people, to challenge their faith in themselves and their society. They work on Macbeth by equivocation, that is, by ambiguous promises of some future state. These promises come true, but not in the way that the victim originally believed. The witches thus make their appeal to Macbeth's and Banquo's desire to control their own future, to direct it towards some desirable ends. They have no power to compel belief, but they can obviously appeal strongly to an already existing inclination to force one's will onto events in order to shape the future to fit one deepest desires.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Banquo's importance in the play stems, in large part, from his different response to these witches. Like Macbeth, he is strongly tempted, but he does not let his desires outweigh his moral caution: But 'tis strange, And oftentimes to win us to our harm The instruments of darkness tell us truths, Win us with honest trifles to betray's In deepest consequence. (1.3.120-124)    Macbeth cannot act on this awareness because his desires (kept alive by his active imagination and his wife's urging) constantly intrude upon his moral sensibilities. Hence, he seizes upon the news that he has just been made Thane of Cawdor, using that information to tell him what he most wants to believe, that the witches tell the truth. This supernatural soliciting Cannot be ill, cannot be good. If ill, Why hath it given me earnest of success

Define personality & motivation

Personalities are usually described as how introverted or extroverted someone is. And introvert is someone who is usually more quiet and thoughtful whereas as an extrovert is someone who is more loud and excitable. If you are either introvert or extrovert it often affects the types of sport you like e. G. And introvert character would usually play something Like tennis as it's a sport they can play as one and not In a team, an extrovert person would usually Like team sports more such as football and rugby. Introverts enjoy sports with more concentration, precision with intricate skills.Introvert characters are usually more self-motivated. Extroverts tend to enjoy sports which are faster paced, exciting and where you need a lower concentration. These are usually team sports and they tend to be motivated by others around them. Extroverted people are often Involved in sports which require a degree of aggression. There are 2 types of aggression: Indirect aggression – this means ta king out your aggression on an object. Direct aggression – The aggression is in the direction of another player. It involves physical contact such as a rugby tackle or in wrestling or boxing.Essence's theory – The Essence's theory was thought of by a German man who Identified two dimensions f personality which act as continuous, with an individual's personality falling anywhere along the two lines, as shown below These two dimensions are stable/unstable and introverted/extroverted. For example, if an Individual Is introverted (shy of social contact) but stable, they are likely to be reliable, calm and controlled. An extroverted (enjoys social affiliation) unstable individual is likely to be tough, aggressive and excitable. Rationality, there are 3 different types of body types; Stepmother – these are people with a tall slim figure, Sheldon thought these people tended to be more Self- unconscious, tense, private (keeps to themselves), and introverted. Endomorphis m – these people are shorter and are a bit fatter, Sheldon thought these people were more tolerant, sociable and relaxed. Monochromes – these are people who have broad shoulders and are more muscular, Sheldon thought these people were more extrovert, assertive, and are risk takers.The Giordano theory (trait theory) – this theory is split into to 2, there are 2 types of people Type A and Type B. Type A – these are more introvert people which enjoy their own company, they have a strong desire to succeed, they like control, often suffers tress and are never happy with what they have (they always want more). Being a type A person will benefit their performance if they are doing a sport which involves only themselves. Type B – these tend to be more extrovert people who are more laid back and happy with what they have, they're less competitive and often work at a slower pace.They do not enjoy control and they're able to relax easily. Being a type B perso n will often benefit them if they're playing a team sports and where they can have the help of others. Motivation – a reason or reasons for acting or behaving in a particular way. There are several theories to do with motivation, these include; The attribution theory – a belief required overtime that one has no control over events and that failure is inevitable / out of their hands. It's a feeling of hopelessness.There are 3 attribution categories these are stability, locus of casualty, locus of control. These 3 categories all go two ways. Stability – you can either be stable or unstable. Locus of casualty – you can either be internal or external. Locus of control – the person can either be in control of themselves or out of control of themselves. Athlete's that attribute their performance outcome to stable internal factors such as effort and ability and to factors under their control are more likely to achieve in sport.Athlete's that attribute the ir performance outcome to unstable-external factors such as luck and difficulty and to factors out of their control are more likely to fail in sport and as they have no goals set out for themselves. Intrinsic motivation comes from within the body, therefore it will be the performer driving themselves to be better. Intrinsic people tend to be able to overcome tasks eave goals set out for themselves to keep progress and maintain motivation. They will have a feeling of pride and enjoyment in their performing the skill.I believe it's better for a performer to be intrinsic because its they are driving themselves to better, they want to be better, therefore they will get better. Extrinsic motivation comes from outside of the performer. These are things which can encourage the athlete to perform and fall into two groups: Tangible rewards: These are physical rewards like medals, trophies and money. These should not be used as much with young athletes o avoid a situation where winning a priz e is more important than competing.

Argonatica

The epic poem highlights the hero Jason, and his quest for the Golden Fleece. According to the myth, Jason and fifty other renowned members of Greece set out for the fleece so that Jason could earn back his father's kingdom. Jason is a particularly interesting hero because he often displays qualities of an efficient leader. This is distinct compared to other heroes, such as Hercules, who are better known as warriors rather than leaders.Apollonius' epic would lay the groundwork for the works of Gaius Valerius Flaccus and Virgil. The Golden Fleece was the item which Jason, with the help of the Argonauts, was forced to retrieve. The origin of the Golden Fleece begins with Phrixus and Helle, the children of Athamus, and the goddess Nephele. When Athamas remarried, the children's stepmother, Ino, became Jealous of them and plotted to get rid of Phrixus and his sister. Ino persuaded two messengers to say that that the oracle required the sacrifice of Phrixus to restore ertility to the fiel ds.Before Phrixus could be sacrificed, however, Nephele sent a golden ram which carried both children off through the air. Helle fell into the Hellespont, but Phrixus arrived safely at Colchis, where he married the daughter of King Aeetes. Phrixus sacrificed the ram to Zeus, and gave its pelt (the Golden Fleece) to Aeetes. Aeetes placed the fleece in an oak tree, where it remained. Then Jason's Father Aeson, was driven from power and killed by his brother Pelias. Jason death is aked and the child is sent away to be taught by the centaur Chiron.Jason returns later to reclaim his throne. However, an oracle warns Pelias that he will die at the hands of one of his relatives and that he should be wary of a man wearing only one sandal. Pelias informs Jason that he would give up his throne if Jason would set out and retrieve the Golden Fleece. The Argonautica begins as Jason is assembling a crew for the Argo. The Argo was the boat which was built by Argos for the Journey. It was slightly l arger than most ships at the time. In many ways the author Apollonius does not highlight the true heroism of Jason.Jason, through the author's description, does not appear as heroic as he really was. The definition of a Greek tragic hero is a man who is neither a pure man nor one who receives his fate as a result of his wickedness, but because of some mistake. From this it can be derived that the tragic hero must be both mortal, and human, and one who receives his fate as a result of error rather than as retribution. In both these instances Jason is a tragic hero ecause he is neither a perfect man nor a terrible man and he dies as a result of mortal mistakes as opposed to retribution.In the case of Jason, his tragic flaw is being too dependent on others. Jason tragic end begins as a result of Medea, who kills Pelias and forces Jason to flee his father's former kingdom after the Journey. Medea then kills Jason's sons and flees after Jason married another woman. Apollonius does not me ntion this part of the myth in his epic. In this way the true entirety of the definition is not fulfilled by the epic. Argonatica By Ibeaulieu

The Use and Abuse of Antibioti essays

The Use and Abuse of Antibioti essays What is an antibiotic? What is this miracle drug that everyone talks about? There is a lot about antibiotics that we should all be more aware of. The word antibiotic actually means anti-life. The most common definition that we use for an antibiotic is: any substance produced by a microorganism that harms or kills another microorganism. There are many different kinds of antibiotic substances, most of them are natural products that certain bacteria and fungi (molds) produce and send outside of their cells. About 90% of the antibiotics we use today, are originated from bacteria. However there are a couple of antibiotics that were created from scratch in laboratory. These totally synthetic antibiotics are designed to inhibit some process previously identified to be completely unique to bacteria, and necessary for the bacterium to remain alive. Bacterium in the wild suffers a constant competition for available nutrients. Therefore if they can develop a substance that can cripple or annihilate their competitors then they have an advantage. So, even though these microorganisms do not have the ability to decide what substance to produce, through several mutations and additional events, they are capacitated to compete and consequently to survive more readily within their environment. We use antibiotics for a different purpose, of course, to help us kill harmful bacteria that cause us infection and disease. Scottish physician Alexander Fleming rediscovered in 1928 what Ernest Duchesne, a French Student, had initially discovered in 1896; the first and most famous fungus, Penicillium, which conceived the first identified microbial antibiotic, penicillin. Commercial methods for penicillin for human use were only developed in 1941 at the time of World War II. Howard Floerey and Ernst Chain made a major effort to try to make penicillin available to all of the British, U.S., and other allies in...

Russias Approach to Peacekeeping Resembles Neo-imperialism †Government Essay

Russias Approach to Peacekeeping Resembles Neo-imperialism – Government Essay Free Online Research Papers Russias Approach to Peacekeeping Resembles Neo-imperialism Government Essay Russian peacekeeping operations have been described by McNeill as â€Å"intervention disguised as peacekeeping missions† (1997). In the early nineties there was a large body of writers arguing that post-Soviet Russian peacekeeping operations were aimed at expanding Russia and consolidating a powerbase throughout the region and subduing the newly independent states of the Transcausas and Central Asia. This essay examines this argument in relation to two case studies of Russian military intervention, Moldova and Tajikistan. The accusation by McNeill that Russian peacekeeping amounts to little more than self-interested military intervention is one that must be rejected upon further analysis of Russian operations as is demonstrated below. After examining the situation it becomes clear that Russia is pursuing a foreign policy that is far from unilateral and self-serving and no different from what any other state would do in a similar situation. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR resulted in a huge shift in the structure of international relations, with balance of power shifting from a bipolar system to a unipolar, or multipolar one depending on one’s point of view (Krauthammer 2002; Huntingdon 1999). This change in the global system and the demise of the USSR caused a large debate in the Russian Federation (RF) about what should constitute its new foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (Shakleina 1995: 83), both in relation to states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and at a global level. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the severe economic crisis in Russia, it lost its place as a world superpower, having neither the military, economic or political strength to maintain such a position. The post-Cold War world has been characterized by ethnic tensions and regional conflicts, with civil and regional wars becoming the norm, for example the disintegration of Yugoslavia and conflict in Somalia (Nikitin 1996: 83). The greatest concern amongst policy makers is the stability and survival of the RF, threatened both internally and externally by ethnic conflicts. Rejecting the idea of having a concrete doctrine, the first Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation (RF) Kozyrez, instead claimed that Russia would adopt a flexible definition of its national interest, based on â€Å"reactions to specific situation[s]† (ibid.). During the early nineties policy makers involved in foreign policy were restricted in both numbers and outlooks, causing policy making to be a confused and fragmented area of the Russian government (Arbatov 1993: 8). Following the break-up of the USSR, there was no mechanism in place to deal with issues of collective security until 1996 when the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreed on guidelines, though this was after all the conflicts had started (Yermolaev 2000). Five points of justification for military action by Russia have b een identified by Holoboff: it must contribute to maintaining Russia’s position as a great power; protect ethnic Russians; prevent the spread of instability; secure Russian geopolitical interests and finally that it coincides with nationalist opinion (1994: pp156-157). For all the rhetoric of Russia as aspiring to play the role of regional hegemon by the West, it is difficult to see how these foreign policy aims are any different to most other states. This view is backed up when examining the examples of Russian intervention/peacekeeping. For the purposes of this essay the main focus will be upon the Yeltsin years, as it was during this era that all of the RF’s peacekeeping operations in â€Å"near abroad† were initiated. The term â€Å"near abroad† is used by Russian policy-makers to refer to the states of the FSU: the old Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) of Central Asia, the Baltic and the Transcaucas (Aldred Smith 2000). The CIS was formed in 1991 in the final days of the Soviet Union, and was intended to be mainly an economic group, though there were also plans to develop it as a defense organization as well. However as with most groups of this nature it merely reflected existing power relationships, with Galeotti describing it as a â€Å"gigantic fig-leaf†, which Yeltsin could use or ignore as he chose (1995: 150). Critics of Western security policy could argue that in this respect it differs little from the US domination of NATO or the UN. The â€Å"near abroad† is not qu ite synonymous with the CIS as the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have so far refused to join. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 25 million ethnic Russians and 5 million Russian speakers found themselves living in the new states of the near abroad outside the boarders of the RF (Tolz 2001: 242). This diaspora has had a significant impact on Russian politics regarding the near abroad, especially in relation to peacekeeping operations (Kolsto, 1993: 198). As with most political concepts, the term â€Å"peacekeeping† has many different interpretations and meanings, resulting in states adopting differing interpretations regarding what can be classed as â€Å"peacekeeping† operations. This is one of the main issues of difference between Russian foreign policy and Western foreign policy, both in theory and in execution. Three key differences between the Russian and Western conception of peacekeeping have been identified by Nikitin (1996: 92). Firstly Russia has acted under a reduced mandate in all operations in the FSU. Instead of operating through the UN, it has been enough to have discussed peacekeeping with both, or even one of the conflicting sides and then only to agree in principal, rather than a full plan. Secondly there is no commitment to using military forces from a neutral party with no interests at stake in the conflict so as to avoid accusations of impartiality or the use of â€Å"peacekeeping† as a t ool for strategic gain (ibid.). The RF has believed that in several of conflicts detailed below that it is acting in a neutral position, as is not directly one of the two sides involved, however the many ties and linkages between the states of the FSU (Arbatov 1993: 7) make true neutrality impossible between any of the CIS states. Thirdly international observers should work separately, rather than alongside peacekeeping forces. Fourthly Nikitin argues that Russia is more concerned with peace-enforcement operations, rather than peacekeeping (1996: 92). These differences in policy help to account for some of the accusations of a neoimperialist agenda. Intervention has a range of definitions, from economic and political coercion by peaceful means to full scale military involvement in another sovereign states’ affairs (Halverson 1994: 76). The idea that Russia operates totally without regard to world opinion and without caring about UN legitimacy is is shown to be false on examination of the evidence. In 1994 Yeltsin claimed that the norms and principals of international law would be the basis of Russia’s foreign policy (Nikitin 1996: 86). Yeltsin also sought UN recognition that the FSU be accepted as part of the Russian sphere of influence and that she should be granted â€Å"special powers as guarantor of peace and stability in the regions of the former Union† (Yeltsin cited in Galeotti 1995: 180). This attempted to give international legitimacy to Russia pursuing an adaptation of the Monroe Doctrine, giving it free reign in its â€Å"backyard†. However this rhetoric was greatly weakened by Russia n actions in Eurasia contributing greatly to much of the instability (ibid.). In addition Holoboff argues that this was based on little more than Yeltsin trying to bolster public support for him by demonstrating that his sympathies lie with Russian’s in the near-abroad rather than with the West (1994: 170) Since 1990 Russia has been involved in four main â€Å"peacekeeping† operations in the area of the FSU; Moldova (1992), Georgia/Abkhazia (1992-), Georgia/South Ossetia (1992-) and Tajikistan (1992-) (Fleitz 2002: 117) and Chechnya within the RF (1994-). These have all been conflicts of secession based on ethnic, rather than political differences. Many of these conflicts were based on tensions that were suppressed in the USSR as the communist government attempt to unite all the ethnic groups of Russia and the CIS region under the banner of the socialist state (Treninl 2000). Yet the Soviet Union was in many ways a continuation of the Tsarist state, and Russians continued to dominate, especially in the SSRs, where ethnic Russians and Russian speakers were privileged over local ethnic groups. The idea of the Soviet Union as the union of many different nationalities was also predominantly the idea of Russians alone and many non-Russians in the outlying republics had a strong r esentment towards Moscow (Kolsto 1993: 198). Russian peacekeeping in these regions has differed greatly from Russian support for UN based missions, for example in Bosnia and Angola where Russian observers supported the UN missions (Yermolaev 2000). Reasons for Russia’s different approach to the near abroad are considered below. Russian peacekeeping operations in the Transdniestria region of Moldova have been one of the most controversial, due to the lack of adherence to international standards in peacekeeping. Following the independence of Moldova from the USSR in 1990 there were fears amongst the Russian section of the population that Moldova would seek to reunite with Romania (OSCE 1994: 1). The major ethnic group in Moldova are the Romanians, accounting for 65% of the population, in comparison Russians account for only 13% (Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2004). In response to the adoption of Romanian as the official language protests developed in the Transdniestria area, resulting in the declaration of a â€Å"Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic† (OSCE 1994: 2). This area had a high level of communist sympathies and a low level of Romanians, with the result that the â€Å"elected† communist government was sympathetic to Moscow. Problems were caused by the Russian 14th Army, led by the hard-line conservative Major-General Lebed, openly siding with the secessionist opponents of the Moldovan government (Holoboff 1994: 163). The 14th Army also supplied weapons and training to civilians during the conflict, in contradiction of all peacekeeping norms (OSCE 1994: 4), though whether this was done officially or not is unknown. The conflict started in December 1991 and it was not until July 1992 that a peacekeeping mission was discussed amongst the CIS states. Originally it was agreed that a CIS peacekeeping taskforce consisting of troops from Ukraine, Romania, Belarus, Russia and Bulgaria would be sent if the Moldovan government requested (OSCE 1994: 3). This initiative failed however as the other states backed out, leaving Moldova with little option but to accept the Russian plan of peacekeepers from Russia, Moldova and Transdniestria. Moldova eventually secured OSCE observation and assistance in 1994. However, even up the present day the Russian 14th Army re mains in Transdniestria, more than 1000km from the Russian border (ibid.) The former republics of Central Asia have been the other main hotspot of instability which the RF has become involved in peacekeeping operations and provides a useful comparison to operations in Moldova. Peacekeeping operations were started in Tajikistan in October 1993, following the bloodiest stage of the Civil War (Nikitin 1996: 91). The civil war started following the break-up of the Soviet Union and was between the Moscow backed communist government and a lose coalition of tribal and regional clans, some of them Islamic fundamentalists. Tajikistan’s location made it vulnerable to Islamic fundamentalism, a situation which has worried both the nearby authoritarian and largely secular former SSRs as well as Moscow (Vasilyev 1996: 69). Fears of a â€Å"domino effect† resulting from the Islamization of one of the former Republics are prevalent both in Moscow and in neighbouring states (Splidsboel-Hansen 1997: 1503; Holoboff 1994: 165). The most distinctive feature of Russian peacekeeping in Tajikistan has been its more multinational dimension and presence of a CIS mandate. In 1993 the heads of the CIS agreed to send a multinational peacekeeping force, consisting of military contingents from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajiks themselves (Nikitin 1996: 91). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan later changed their minds, and Russia provided most of the troops eventually. Support from CIS states outside of the region was also non-existent; Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova all refused to send troops. Russian troops were used to seal the â€Å"transparent† Afghan border to prevent the movement of weapons and drugs and mujahidin. In 1994 a UN peacekeeping mission, UNMOT, was despatched to supervise the ceasefire and to stabilise the country (Taylor 2002). By the time of the UN’s involvement support from CIS states other than Russia amount to little more than a token effort (Shakleina 1995: 103) The two above case studies arguably demonstrate little in the way of a neoimperialist foreign policy pursue by the RF under the guise of peacekeeping. Certainly Russian conceptions of peacekeeping have differed from traditionally accepted ones in many ways, however there is no strong evidence that Russia is embarking on a deliberately expansionist policy. Firstly in both cases there has been an eventual acceptance of the need to involve supranational bodies, in Moldova the OSCE and in Tajikistan the UN, which is hardly consistent with the idea of an expansionist state seeking to further its own regional gains. Russia also assisted with peacekeeping in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh somewhat reluctantly and at its own expense (Holoboff 1994: 168) In none of the cases has Russia acted unilaterally with no consultation, there has been no Afghanistan or Hungarian type operations in response to perceived security threats. Russia has found it hard to act multilaterally when states in the CIS refuse to send troops to backup their declarations. One of the main reasons for CIS states refusing to send troops is that it would be of no benefit to their state, for example this was the reason given by Turkmenistan for refusing to send troops to assist in Tajikistan (Brown 1996: 237). Russia has also had to step in when other states outside the region have refused assistance. The UN initially refused to become involved in the conflict in Abkhazia as conditions were â€Å"not ripe† (Ivanov 1996: 78) for UN involvement, as a result of the bloodshed Russia was forced to step in and provide the framework and troops for peacekeeping, again out her own pocket. Secondly there appears to be a development of Russian policy as it becomes used to a new concept, for example the adoption of a CIS doctrine on peacekeeping. Peacekeeping formed only a very limited feature of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy, instead preferring to see conflicts in a more black and white approach such as its support for national liberation movements, for example in Angola. Thirdly Russia’s approach to its neighbouring states seems more concerned with guarding its own borders and preserving its security. Refusing to allow places such as Tajikistan to become Islamic fundamentalist states represents a prudent, rather than expansionist foreign policy, especially when considering the large level of non-Russian Muslims in the Central Asian states and the destabilising effect this would have on Russia proper. In addition to these factors the RF has also not installed puppet regimes in either of these conflicts, or any of the other ones which it has been inv olved in, signifying a major break in policy from the days of the Soviet Union. In many ways the shedding of the outlying SSRs in Central Asia has been a benefit to the RF as she would no longer have to economically support them or use troops to resolve ethnic and tribal conflicts (Smith 1999: 49). Regardless of its long lineage, the new RF is less than 15 years old as a democratic state; as such it must be expected to take some time to develop its foreign policies. Certainly in light of recent US/UK actions in Iraq and Afghanistan it is hard to accuse the RF as being alone in pursuing an â€Å"imperialist† agenda. A more accurate description I would argue is that the RF is adopting a Monroe Doctrine-esque strategy and that policies in Central Asia and the Transcaucas are more readily comparable to US actions in Latin America than any of the â€Å"classic† European Empires such as the British or French. Russia’s actions in Moldova and Tajikistan appear to have very limited geostrategic benefits for the RF, for example it would not be in Russia’s interests to have another Kaliningrad. It would be incorrect to view them as altruistic peace-orientated acts, though is peacekeeping ever without some form of hidden agenda? The Central Asian states are also dependent on Russia to a large extent to provide security for them. Following the dissolution of the Union, the Central Asian states wanted a common CIS defence force to provide security, removing the financial burden on their already weak economies (Brown 1995: 235). When this failed to happen they became dependent on Russia for training, equipment and enforcement in times of crisis (ibid.). This further weakens the case for the neoimperialist argument, making Russian activity seem more like an â€Å"empire by invitation† than imperial aggrandisement. CIS member states have also been unwilling to provide the military personal needed for peacekeeping operations, resulting in Russia bearing the burden unilaterally, despite CIS approval, for example in Tajikistan (Yermolaev 2000). It is also too early yet to see whether hostility will emerge at a governmental level to Russian involvement in Central Asia. A criticism by Holoboff of Russia’s peacekeeping operations is that despite Russia’s official democratic status, Moscow has supported hard-line communist governments numerous times (1994: 165). This is implying that Russia has not changed her old ways, yet how many authoritarian and repressive governments has the West supported in favour of ones they believe will be more hostile? A good example is the estimated $3bn worth of aid the US has given to Pakistan, despite being ruled by an unelected military junta that came to power in a coup d’etat (Kux 2003). This aid is being given as a reward for Islamabad’s support for the US’ war on terror, even though Pakistan has provided a large level of support for Islamists in the past, has an active nuclear weapons programme, a poor human rights record and a hostile foreign policy towards India over the Kashmir region, which may yet degenerate into nuclear war. When compared to examples like this, Moscowâ⠂¬â„¢s realpolitik foreign policy of supporting corrupt or repressive regimes almost looks as if it is just following international norms. Since the â€Å"war on terror† was declared by the US, criticism of Russia for its activities in suppressing Islamist fundamentalism has been lessened, especially in Chechnya (Csongos 2001). Criticism against Russian actions in the region have subsided in recent years as Moscow has been transformed into an ally of the West in the â€Å"war against terror†. It is also likely that it has become apparent that the â€Å"old Russia† of the Cold War has disappeared, and that there is no longer the political will or capacity for future large scale conflicts with the West. Russia has even been criticised for not having an active enough presence in Transdniestria in order to prevent the proliferation of the large amount of ex-Soviet weapons located there (Warrick 2003). Vasilyev concludes by claiming that Russia’s peacekeeping operations are not motivated by a â€Å"neo-imperial ambitions† but by a rational calculation of Russia’s security interests; without peace and stability on its borders Russia will find it difficult to achieve its full economic potential (1996: 80). I would support his conclusion with reference to the lack of unilateral action taken, the acceptance of outside mediation and support and the very real need for Russia to secure itself as evidence for the strength of this conclusion. Bibliography Books Fleitz, H. (2002) Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s (Praeger: London) Galeotti, M. (1994) The Age of Anxiety (Longman: Harlow) Raevsky, A. Vorob’ev, I. N. (1994) Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping (UNIDIR: New York) Smith, G. (1999) The Post Soviet States: Mapping the Politics of Transition (Arnold: London) Tolz, V. (2001) Inventing the Nation: Russia (Arnold: London) Edited Books Brown, B. (1995) â€Å"Security and Military Issues in Central Asia† in Parrot, B. ed. State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (M.E. Sharpe: London) Halverson, T. (1994) â€Å"Disengagement by Stealth: The Emerging Gap Between America’s Rhetoric and the Reality of Future European Conflicts† in Freedman, L. ed. Military Intervention in European Conflicts (Blackwell: London) Holoboff, E. (1994) â€Å"Military Intervention: The Russian View† in Freedman, L. ed. Military Intervention in European Conflicts (Blackwell: London) Nikitin, A. (1996) â€Å"Peace Support Operations on the Territory of the Former Soviet Union† in Carlton, D. et al. eds. Rising Tension in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (Dartmouth: Aldershot) Shakleina, T. (1995) â€Å"Russian Policy Toward Military Conflict in the Former Soviet Union† in Parrot, B. ed. State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (M.E. Sharpe: London) Journal Articles Arbatov, A. 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Russia and its `Near Abroad† jha.ac/articles/a025.htm Accessed 25/5/04 (Journal of Humanitarian Assistance) Csongos, F. (2001) â€Å"Russia: U.S. Says No Deal With Moscow† cdi.org/russia/173.html##1 (Centre for Defense Information) Accessed 27/5/04 Kux, D. (2003) â€Å"Looking at US aid to Pakistan† mideasti.org/articles/doc146.html Accessed 28/5/04 (Middle East Institute) Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia (2004) http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761566942/Moldova.html#s4 Accessed 25/5/04 (Microsoft) OSCE (1994) â€Å"Transdniestrian Conflict: Origins and Main Issues† osce.org/moldova/documents/files/background.pdf Accessed 25/5/04 (OSCE) Taylor, R. (2002) â€Å"Tajikistan: Time to Reflect† http://articles.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1309/is_4_39/ai_96951759 (UN Chronicle: Dec.2002) Accessed 26/5/04 Treninl, D. (2000) â€Å"Peacekeeping in the Former Soviet Union: Lessons for Africa† iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Peacekee.html Accessed 26/5/04 (Monograph) Yermolaev, M. (2000 â€Å"Russias International Peacekeeping and Conflict Management in the Post-soviet Environment† iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No44/RussiasPeacekeeping.html Accessed 31/5/04 (Monograph) Newspaper Articles Warrick, J. (2003) â€Å"Dirty Bomb Warheads Disappear: Stocks of Soviet-Era Arms For Sale on Black Market† Washington Post 7/12/03 washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp- dyn?pagename=articlecontentId=A41921-2003Dec6notFound=true Accessed 31/5/04 Research Papers on Russia's Approach to Peacekeeping Resembles Neo-imperialism - Government EssayAppeasement Policy Towards the Outbreak of World War 2Assess the importance of Nationalism 1815-1850 EuropePETSTEL analysis of IndiaRelationship between Media Coverage and Social andTwilight of the UAWThe Effects of Illegal ImmigrationOpen Architechture a white paperBringing Democracy to AfricaInfluences of Socio-Economic Status of Married Males19 Century Society: A Deeply Divided Era